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Abstract: Corruption presents an assurance problem to businesses: all businesses are best oﬀ if none act corruptly but in the event that corruption occurs are better oﬀ if they act corruptly than if they do not, and because there is no assurance that other actors are not cheating a business does not know how to act. The usual solution to an assurance problem – criminal sanctions imposed on cheaters – does not work in a corrupt system. Integrative Social Contract Theory suggests a solution to the assurance problem. Application of Integrative Social Contract Theory to corruption demonstrates that in the case of corruption it has advantages over international law, and that the theory’s elegance lies in its recognition of norms generated by multiple communities. 
INTRODUCTION 
Tom Dunfee wrote, with David Hess, of a ‘‘paradox of corruption’’ (2000, 
pp. 595–600). They begin with a rather broad paradox: ‘‘corruption is 
universally disapproved yet universally present’’ (2000, p. 595). They move 
on to the more speciﬁc: 
There is a growing movement against the practice, yet there is 
no hard evidence that the level of corruption is declining – and 
it may even be increasing. Firms aggressively seek to 
prevent the corruption of their own employees while 
simultaneously approving of attempts to corrupt the 
employees of potential suppliers. Firms from countries that 
have reputations for being relatively clean of corruption are 
thought to be major sources of corruption in other countries. 
(2000, p. 608) 
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Dunfee and Hess use the existence of this paradox as an expository tool to 
introduce their real interest – a framework for controlling corruption – and 
do not explore the paradox’s nature or origins. Within that paradox, however, 
lies a problem that is critical to understanding corruption and to 
understanding how to control corruption. Interestingly, unraveling the 
paradox Dunfee and Hess describe leads to another body of Dunfee’s 
research, and to the idea that norms generated within multiple economic 
communities may contribute substantially to controlling corruption. 
THE REAL PARADOX OF CORRUPTION 
I have elsewhere described the predicament of businesses with respect to 
corruption as an assurance problem (Nichols, 2004). Brieﬂy, an assurance 
problem exists when actors are best oﬀ if they cooperate with one another, 
but in the event of cheating by another actor are better oﬀ if they 
themselves also cheat than they would be if they continued to comply 
with the rules. 
Because the actors cannot monitor one another, they face uncertainty 
as to which course of action will yield the best result. Jean Jacque Rousseau 
([1775] 1983) compared these actors to a group of hunters who only by 
working together can hunt in such a way that makes likely the capture of a 
stag, which will provide bountiful meet for all. A hunter who neglects her 
responsibilities to the group in order that she may instead capture a rabbit 
that she spies will not enjoy the bountiful meat of the stag, but will still have 
some rabbit meat. Because she stopped cooperating, however, the hunters 
who fulﬁlled their responsibilities toward the group hunt rather than 
collecting rabbits on their own get nothing when the stag slips through the gap 
created by defection – the hunters who cooperated will starve. The hunters 
must maintain silence and thus are unable to monitor one another; in the 
absence of assurance that their comrades continue to cooperate each hunter 
faces a conundrum when a rabbit presents an opportunity to defect (Skyrms, 
2004). 
Corruption clearly presents an assurance problem for businesses. If all actors 
abide by the rules, if no business acts corruptly, then all will be better oﬀ. 
On the other hand, if defection occurs, then those that do defect – those that 
act corruptly – will at least survive, whereas those that attempt to abide by 
the rules will probably suﬀer and could be driven out of business. The 
assurance problem created by corruption is amply demonstrated through 
examination of the harms caused by corruption. 
Many scholars and many scholarly pieces enumerate the damage inﬂicted by 
corruption. Corruption inﬂicts profound damage on society. Selçuk Akçay 
provides a powerful summary of the empirical research on the eﬀects of 
corruption: 
It reduces economic growth, retards long-term domestic and 
foreign investments, enhances inﬂation, depreciates national 
currency, reduces expenditures for education and health, 
increases military expenditures, misallocates talent to rent-
seeking activities, pushes ﬁrms underground, distorts markets 
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and the allocation of resources, increases income inequality 
and poverty, reduces tax revenues, increased child and infant 
mortality rates, distorts the fundamental role of the 
government (on enforcement or contracts and protection of 
property rights), and undermines the legitimacy of 
government and of the market  economy. (2006, pp. 29–30) 
Susan Rose-Ackerman provides an equally powerful summary of the social 
eﬀects of corruption: 
Corruption undermines the legitimacy of governments, 
especially democracies . . . Citizens may come to believe that 
the government is simply for sale to the highest bidder. 
Corruption undermines claims that the government is 
substituting democratic values for decisions based on ability 
to pay. It can lead to coups by undemocratic leaders. (2001, 
p. 44)
Corruption has been identiﬁed as a signiﬁcant cause of dissatisfaction with 
economic and democratic reforms. When reformers announce economic and 
democratic changes in polities transitioning from repressive or authoritarian 
systems of governance, and persons living under those regimes then 
experience increases in systemic and often predatory corruption, those 
persons easily confuse democracy with corruption. This phenomenon has 
been particularly visible in Eastern Europe (Gray and Jarosz, 1995). 
Corruption also aﬀects business. Corruption increases costs, 
degrades the quality of administrative support and service, and decreases 
the enforceability of agreements (Nichols, 2004, pp. 1321–1326). The rusty 
theory that bribery beneﬁted a business by allowing it to more quickly take 
advantage of markets and opportunities has largely been discredited; it 
describes a momentary (and only occasional) result of a bribe rather than the 
consequences over time of paying that bribe (Salbu, 1999, p. 49). Businesses 
are better oﬀ without corruption. 
In a systemically corrupt system, however, a business that does not 
act corruptly may face extinction. A systemically corrupt system can be 
contrasted with an uncorrupted system. In an uncorrupted system, decision 
makers generally base purchasing decisions on how closely a good or service 
ﬁts their needs and on price. A business that capably uses its resources to 
produce goods or services that satisfy the decision makers’ needs and to lower 
the prices that it charges for those goods or services will be rewarded. In a 
systemically corrupt system, decision makers use an entirely diﬀerent 
formula. Decision makers choose goods or services based on the quality of 
the bribe1 rather than the intrinsic qualities of those goods or services. A 
business that competently uses its resources to provide the highest quality 
bribe will be rewarded (Bader and Shaw, 1983). A business that instead 
devotes a meaningful percentage of its resources to the quality of its goods or 
services cannot compete with a business that uses its resources to produce 
a higher quality bribe. In a systemically corrupt polity, therefore, businesses 
that do not cheat face extinction. 
Clearly, corruption presents an assurance problem for businesses. Businesses 
will be better oﬀ if all (or almost all) businesses cooperate and if all 
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businesses abide by the rules regarding corruption. If, however, some 
businesses defect, then the defecting business – the business that enters into 
corrupt relationships – will be better oﬀ than those businesses that abide by 
the rules and continue to avoid corrupt relationships. 
RESOLVING THE ASSURANCE PROBLEM 
 Ama rtya Sen (1967, 1977) brought a great deal of attention to the 
assurance problem as a game theoretic. Studying assurance games does 
provide insights into the real world (Bruhl, 2003; Harsanyi, 1986). 
Economists and philosophers alike agree that in the real world criminal 
sanctions constitute the traditional solution for an assurance problem 
(Axelrod, 1984; Rawls, 1971). Criminal sanctions, however, rarely have 
eﬀect in conditions of systemic corruption, for the fairly obvious reason 
that the defecting actor – the corrupt party – can purchase a favorable 
decision rather than suﬀer the actual penalty (Katyal, 2003, p. 1398; Reed, 
2001., pp. 467–68; Richman, 2003, p. 825). 
The transnational regime has responded. The United Nations agreed 
upon a Convention Against Corruption, which promotes cooperation among 
nations in combating corruption (United Nations, 2003). More concretely, 
the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development requires all 
members to criminalize transnational bribery by persons or entities under 
their jurisdiction (Delaney, 2007). The Organization of American States 
imposes a similar requirement on its members, although members have 
not enacted legislation as rapidly as have the members of the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (Lacey et al., 
2005). International Financial Institutions such as the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund blacklist contractors who have been involved 
in corruption in funded projects (Rogers, 2008). David Hess describes some 
of the measures taken by business regulators in his article in this volume 
(Hess, 2009). 
These eﬀorts in some ways correct the failure of the traditional 
solution to the assurance problem created by corruption. A defecting actor 
might purchase a favorable decision from corrupt decision makers in a 
systemically corrupt polity, but that actor is less likely to be able to do so in 
its presumably less corrupt home country, and thus transnationally corrupt 
actors do face penalties for not cooperating. 
These eﬀorts fall short, however, by reaching only those actors who 
act transnationally or who involve themselves in trans- national projects. 
These sanctions do not provide assurance to local actors who compete and 
cooperate with other local actors. As mentioned, local criminal sanctions do 
not provide assurance, because corrupt actors can purchase favorable 
treatment. The assurance problem created by corruption is not solved 
through the actions of the transnational regime. 
INTEGRATIVE SOCIAL CONTRACT THEORY 
Tom Dunfee’s body of work, particularly that conducted in 
 Philip M. Nichols  Multiple Communities and Controlling Corruption 5
collaboration with Tom Donaldson, provides two insights into a possible 
solution to the dilemma noted by Dunfee and Hess. Integrative Social 
Contract Theory, described elaborately in this volume and elsewhere, 
focuses on behaviors and standards agreed to within self-constituted 
communities. Two important artifacts form boundaries around those 
agreements: a macro-social contract and hypernorms. 
Integrative Social Contract Theory integrates two sets of contracts. 
The ﬁrst is the implicit social contract of the sort that philosophers such 
as Locke and Rawls placed at the center of their own theories of ethics and 
social organization (Keeley, 1995, pp. 244–246). Locke, for example, 
famously suggested an implied contract binding governments to respect the 
rights of those governed. Macrosocial contracts are those rules that would 
be agreed to by the great majority of rational and educated members of a 
society; they are the principles that allow a large social organization to 
function, they are normative – what Dunfee and Donaldson refer to as 
‘‘oughts’’ (1999, p. 24; see Donaldson and Dunfee, 1994, p. 254; 1995, 
p. 93). By necessity, therefore, they are relatively few and they are somewhat
general in nature.
Dunfee and Donaldson suggest that, given this condition of 
generalized rules, one rule on which rational participants would agree is that 
economic actors within a society are free to form distinct communities, within 
which they may negotiate more speciﬁc rules (1999, p. 37). “A community is 
a self-deﬁned, self-circumscribed group of people who interact in the context 
of shared tasks, values of goals and who are capable of establishing norms 
of ethical behavior for themselves” (1999, p. 38). Dunfee and Donaldson’s 
conception encompasses communities as large and as structured as the 
European community and as small and spontaneous as a handful of friends 
pooling resources to purchase lottery tickets (Dunfee, 1993, p. 68). 
The rules negotiated among members of these smaller communities 
provide the detail and direction not provided by the macrosocial contract, 
they “ﬁll in what macro contracts leave out” (1999, p. 20; see Donaldson and 
Dunfee, 1994, pp. 260–262; 1995, pp. 93–95). The directives, regulations, 
and rulings of the European Community constitute microsocial contracts, so 
too does an agreement among friends as to how to divide any winnings 
from a jointly purchased lottery ticket. While macrosocial contracts embody 
“oughts,” microsocial contracts manifest what ‘‘is’’ (1999, p. 24). 
Integrative Social Contract Theory, therefore, unites the ought and the is. 
These two sets of social contracts, integrated through operation of the 
macrosocial norm that grants smaller communities the authority to create 
rules, are themselves bounded by incontestable, non-negotiated norms, 
denominated by Dunfee and Donaldson as hypernorms. Hypernorms 
constitute “a thin universal morality . . .  principles so fundamental that, 
by deﬁnition, they serve to evaluate low-order norms . . . reaching to the root 
of what is ethical for humanity’’ (1999, pp. 43–44). A social contract of any 
sort that contravenes a hypernorm has no power or legitimacy. 
Dunfee, and Dunfee and Donaldson discuss bribery in terms of these 
hypernorms. They begin with the observation that the universal 
condemnation of corruption probably constitutes a hypernorm (1999, p. 
225; Dun fee, Smit h an d Ross , 1999, p. 24). Every polity in the world 
criminalizes bribery, every survey conducted indicates that even in polities 
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in which corruption is prevalent it is despised (Nichols, 1997, p. 318). Every 
major religion in the world condemns corruption: the Holy Qoran proclaims 
that ‘‘Allah loveth not the corrupter’’ (sura 28:77), the book shared by the 
Jewish and Christian faith directs ‘‘you must not accept a bribe, for a bribe 
blinds clear-sighted men’’ (Exodus 23:8). Bribery violates the second precept 
of morality prescribed by the Buddha (Dhammaratana, 1972, pp. 7–18), 
violates the ‘‘righteous rule’’ proscribed by Sikhism (Singh, 1986, p. 141), and 
incurred draconian punishment in ancient Hindu texts (Thakur, 1979, p. 
14). The Confucians, predictably, censured corruption (Cleary and 
Higonnet, 1987, p. 669) and the Taoists, just as predictably, mocked it (Lao 
Tzu, [168 b.c.e.]  1989, p. 22). 
This universal, and ancient, condemnation of corruption is not 
enough for Dunfee and Donaldson. What if, they argue, everyone in the 
world changes their mind and embraces corruption as a moral good (1999, p. 
226)? In that case, they argue, both a macrosocial contract and a superior 
hypernorm militate against corruption. 
The macrosocial contract involves the duty of the bribe-taking actor 
to its principals. Public sector corruption is usually deﬁned as use or abuse of 
public oﬃce or trust for personal rather than public beneﬁt (Nye, 1967, p. 
419); private sector corruption would have a similar deﬁnition. Corruption, 
therefore, essentially involves a betrayal of a trust relationship. The 
foundation for that trust relationship, the basic rules, would constitute part 
of the macrosocial contract of a polity. Corruption breaches this macrosocial 
contract. 
Dunfee and Donaldson, however, are not content with this 
macrosocial norm. The general principle that one honors a trust relationship, 
they suggest, does not preclude corruption driven by a superior macrosocial 
norm or by a hypernorm, nor does it in their mind apply to the bribe-giver. 
They therefore turn to two more hypernorms. First, they point out that 
public corruption deprives honest persons of participation in government. 
‘‘To the extent that one places a positive, transnational value on the right to 
political participation, large bribes of publicly elected oﬃcials damage that 
value’’ (1999, pp. 126–127). Even the application of this hypernorm, 
however, does not satisfy them, because it does not apply to all corruption.2 
Dunfee and Donaldson therefore turn to a ﬁnal hypernorm – a 
hypernorm to which they give special attention. Corruption, they argue, 
violates the fundamental hypernorm of necessary social eﬃciency (1999, 
pp. 229–230). Institutions and norms, they claim, should function to provide 
people with social goods. All actors who participate in the economic life of 
a polity, therefore, have a responsibility toward the provision of social 
goods. Corruption destroys social good rather than producing it; corruption 
violates the requirement embraced in this hypernorm. 
Having gone through a thorough application of Integrative Social 
Contract Theory to the problem of corruption, Dunfee and Donaldson are 
able to conclusively say that their framework does provide instruction to a 
business manager. This conclusion, however, promises to be most 
dissatisfying to the manager. It tells the manager what the manager already 
knows, and does not provide a solution to the manager’s real problem. The 
manager already knows that laws and social norms prohibit the payment of a 
bribe – corruption is in fact universally proscribed and universally 
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condemned. The manager’s real problem is ascertaining whether or not 
competitors will pay the bribe. The problem is one of assurance. 
 The solution to the assurance problem does not lie in Dunfee and 
Donaldson’s discussion of hypernorms or in macrosocial contracts. Instead, 
the solution lies in microsocial contracts – in rules explicitly negotiated 
among self-constituted communities. 
 
 
THE MICROSOCIAL CONTRACT 
 
 Dunfee and Donaldson ignore the microsocial contract when 
speaking of corruption, yet it is the microsocial contract that oﬀers the most 
promise in providing meaningful guidance to managers with respect to 
corruption. Dunfee and Donaldson recognize a world made up of multiple, 
overlapping economic communities. Groups of businesses aﬀected by 
speciﬁc types of corruption could be described as a community. These 
communities may or may not recognize themselves as such; a ﬁrst step toward 
resolving the assurance problem is acknowledgement  that these businesses 
together form a band of hunters who can capture stag together or rabbits 
alone. 
 Precedents exist for businesses forming explicit communities. These 
range, as Dunfee and Donaldson might predict, from local professional clubs 
to global organizations such as the International Chamber of Commerce. 
Many of these organizations embrace discussion of normative issues. 
CentraRSE, for example, brings together more than one hundred 
Guatemalan businesses in  twenty diﬀerent sectors speciﬁcally for the 
purpose of developing standards for the social responsibility of business.3 
The International Chamber of Commerce, working with thousands of 
businesses, develops model codes of conduct including codes directed at 
social issues (Getz, 1990). It is  important to note  that many  of these 
economic communities overlap political boundaries: the Caux Roundtable, 
for example, speciﬁcally brings together businesses of diﬀerent cultures 
and particularly diﬀerent faiths for the purpose of discussing and developing 
normative standards (Küng, 1997, pp. 24–25); Transparency International 
develops standards of behavior for business sectors regardless of the home 
country of the business (O’Higgins, 2006). 
 Proactive, explicit negotiation within these economic communities 
of rules regarding corruption has four advantages over simple reliance on 
the hypernorms or macrosocial contracts regarding corruption. First, the 
macrosocial contract will reinforce and reaﬃrm the hypernorm. The Holy 
Qoran, for example, straightforwardly states that Allah does not love those 
who corrupt, and yet rampant corruption ﬂourishes in some piously Islamic 
countries. Corruption violates dharma, yet corruption ﬂourishes in some 
devoutly Buddhist countries. The very nature of the paradox noted by Dunfee 
and Hess suggests that in the case of corruption the existence of a clear 
hypernorm is not enough to control corrupt behavior. Microsocial contracts 
can reinforce the ‘‘ought’’ of a hypernorm by posting an agreed-upon ‘‘is.’’ 
 Second, as Dunfee and Donaldson point out, the microsocial contract 
will have more detail than the macrosocial contract or a hypernorm. 
Corruption involves complex behaviors.4 Dealing with complex behaviors 
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requires more than a simple proscription. The absurdity of a simple 
proscription is amply demonstrated by an edict proclaimed by former 
Philippines dictator Ferdinand Marcos, who forbid government employees 
from accepting any gifts from any persons at any times, including holiday or 
birthday gifts from family members. This draconian policy was almost 
certainly ignored by most government employees, and did little to prevent 
Marcos’s Philippines from being perceived as one of the most corrupt 
polities in the global economy. Indeed, a simple proscription on corruption 
provides almost no guidance to an actual actor; the lack of real guidance 
translates into a lack of assurance that other actors will cooperate with the 
rules and leaves that actor facing a conundrum when he or she is presented 
with an opportunity to act corruptly. 
 The microsocial contract should establish a minimum level of 
conduct, whether by rule or by value. The United States’ Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act, for example, prohibits all transnational business-related 
bribery except bribes paid to facilitate non- discretionary clerical acts. 
While most ethical frameworks would ﬁnd the payment of facilitating bribes 
morally reprehensible, and while those bribes do inﬂict social and 
economic damage, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act as a microsocial 
contract does establish a minimum standard of behavior – actors are free to 
comply with higher standards but all have agreed to at least behave in this 
way.5 
 Third, local communities can agree upon methods of reporting 
cheating that do not rely on corrupt government institutions. The 
conventional response to an assurance problem – enforcement of rules by 
the state – does not solve the assurance problem created by corruption 
because corruption renders the state ineﬀective. Self-constituted 
communities, on the other hand, can develop other methods of enforcing 
standards or can create channels for conveying information about the 
behavior of other actors. Methods of enforcement could include measures 
such as aﬀecting the reputation of businesses that engage in corruption, 
reporting corrupt businesses to international agencies, excluding corrupt 
businesses from preferential arrangements, or imposing private penalties 
and fees. Methods of conveying information could include measures such 
as corruption audits, reporting mechanisms for members of the public, and 
decision-making certiﬁcations similar to those used to ensure capable 
accounting processes or compliance with human resources or labor laws. 
 Fourth, the process of negotiating rules and norms regarding 
corruption could help to reduce corruption and to engender trust within a 
community of businesses. Martin Sandbu (2007) has written of the value of 
process. Sandbu demonstrates that actors ﬁnd value in process 
distinguishable from the outcome of that process. With respect to 
corruption, the very act of discussing openly and negotiating standards for 
a practice usually hidden in shadows can begin to generate trust and under- 
standing among the parties. 
 
 
 
 
 
 Philip M. Nichols  Multiple Communities and Controlling Corruption 9  
INTEGRATIVE SOCIAL CONTRACT THEORY IS SUPERIOR TO 
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN SOLVING THE ASSURANCE PROBLEM 
 
 Controlling corruption will require many tools; law and international 
law will play an important role. Integrative Social Contract Theory, 
however, highlights deﬁciencies of international law; law alone cannot 
resolve the damage inﬂicted by corruption. 
 Integrative Social Contract Theory integrates two sets of contracts: 
the aspirational macrosocial contract – the ‘‘ought’’ – and the far more 
tangible microsocial contract – the ‘‘is.’’ International law also, 
inadvertently, integrates an ‘‘ought’’ and an ‘‘is.’’ The ‘‘ought’’ consists of 
a highly idealized notion of the only relevant international actor: nations. 
Although international law has undergone a healthy dose of transformation, 
at its core it remains the law of nations. The nations envisioned in 
international law, however, are more idealization than reality. International 
law envisions self-contained nations with impermeable borders, their 
equality sacrosanct. In reality, nations are highly interdependent, the people 
who reside in those nations form multitudinous relationships across the 
political boundaries of nations, and nations do not exist in a state of 
organizational equality.6 Indeed, parts of the world are not even organized 
into nations. 
 Integrative Social Contract Theory is not bounded by political 
borders. Although one can if one desires read Dunfee and Donaldson as 
implying that macrosocial communities consist of nations, that need not 
be the case. Moreover, microsocial communities explicitly can exist 
without reference to political borders. International law envisions 
communities that stop at the border, with nation acting as the proxy or 
representative when negotiating norms across or between borders. 
Integrative Social Contract Theory gives expression to natural human 
communities. 
 Integrative Social Contract Theory also takes into account the 
multiple communities to which one business or person may belong. 
International law  recognizes but one community; all other communities are 
subsumed or are extensions of the nation. As a result, Integrative Social 
Contract Theory reaches levels of human organization not reached by 
international law. While political science’s discussion of ‘‘devolution’’ of 
policymaking authority has to some extent entered the jurisprudential  
dialogue (e.g., Koch, 2007), doctrinal international law continues to 
consider nations the cardinal form of organization. International law does 
not reach subgroups within those states, or across states, and has no method 
of accounting for quasi states or polities that exist outside the recognized 
state system. 
 Integrative Social Contract Theory is also far more democratic than 
international law. As Robert Jackson has pointed out, international law no 
longer even requires that a nation be nominally representative of its people 
(Jackson, 1987). Under modern principles of international law the most 
despotic nation is accorded equal rank and privilege with all other nations; 
and its internal rules accrue equal measures of respect and deference. 
Integrative Social Contract Theory, on the other hand, imposes tests of 
authenticity on purported rules. Moreover, communities that may be 
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minorities within a larger macrosocial community are still accorded freedom 
to negotiate rules within their own economic community and these rules may 
survive challenges by the larger community. The same is not true of 
international law. 
 
 
THE USE OF INTEGRATIVE SOCIAL CONTRACT THEORY 
 
 Dunfee and Donaldson’s application of Integrative Social Contract 
Theory to corruption is interesting, but ultimately does not provide 
suﬃcient guidance to managers working in corrupt systems. Nonetheless, 
Integrative Social Contract Theory itself ultimately proves a far more useful 
norm-generating mechanism than does international law. The application of 
Integrative Social Contract Theory to corruption illustrates two aspects of 
the theory that may have use for managers faced with other, similar 
decisions. 
 First, hypernorms do little to assist a manager who needs speciﬁc 
guidance when faced with a speciﬁc problem. In the case of corruption, the 
hypernorms identiﬁed by Dunfee and Donaldson at most tell a businessperson 
not to pay bribes; this does not help the businessperson facing the assurance 
problem created by corruption. Regardless of whether the controlling 
hypernorm is the universal condemnation of corruption or a hypernorm of 
eﬃciency, the businessperson already knows not to pay and instead needs 
direction as to how not to pay and how to rust that others will not pay. 
 Hypernorms, like macrosocial contracts, are by their very nature 
likely to be general in nature and lacking in detail. They provide signposts 
rather than maps. Instrumentally, hypernorms may be more useful in 
validating or invalidating locally created norms than in directing speciﬁc 
action. If a local community, for example, of businesspersons negotiated 
among themselves a norm accepting or promoting bribery, the hypernorms 
condemning corruption would disqualify their microsocial contract. 
 Such an instrumental purpose does have value. As Dunfee (1999, 
p. 146) himself noted, it is likely that a hypernorm exists prohibiting the 
use of torture: numerous international instruments prohibit torture, cultural 
consensus condemns torture, and most people are repelled by torture (Koh, 
1991, p. 2376). In the United States, a small group of people suggested that 
the President of the country could abrogate international law and authorize 
torture; the ensuing debate has asked among other things whether such a 
regime should be allowed. A hypernorm against torture would suggest that 
this microsocial contract is not legitimate. 
 Second, although some critics may suggest that Integrative Social 
Contract Theory is too cumbersome, in that it requires managers to discern 
microsocial contracts before making decisions, those critics would miss the 
true elegance of the theory. The elegance of the theory lies in its recognition 
that multiple communities do exist and that they do negotiate rules among 
themselves. Integrative Social Contract Theory recognizes that the vast bulk 
of the world’s norms are not preceded by the phrase ‘‘hyper,’’ even though 
those might be the norms that receive the most scholarly attention. 
 Corruption will not be eradicated through the simple observation that 
corruption is wrong and should not be engaged in – the paradox noted by 
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Dunfee and Hess indicates that the universal proscription sometimes has no 
eﬀect. Real control requires that communities explicitly address corruption 
and generate trust and assurance through the negotiation of speciﬁc rules. 
As Tom Dunfee’s theory suggests, control of corruption requires the 
integration of a universal ought with a clearly articulated local is.    
 
Notes 
 
 1 The quality of the bribe refers not only to its size but also to the bribe-taker’s ability to use a particular bribe. 
 2 The hypernorm does not speak to petty corruption, nor does it address corruption in undemocratic polities. 
 3  Information on CentraRSE can be found at http://www.centrarse.org. 
 4 Corruption certainly is not unique in this respect – indeed, many of the behaviors contemplated under the rubric of business ethics involve complex decisions and relationships. 
 5  The facilitating payment exception of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act is a particularly apt example of a microsocial  contract, because it resulted from lengthy deliberations between the United States legislature and domestic businesses. 
 6 This is not to say that nations are inherently unequal. Rather, organizationally some nations subordinate functions to other nations, Switzerland, for example, includes the nation of Lichtenstein within its customs territory; some nations subordinate  their governing process to other nations, France and Spain, for example, appoint the heads of state of the nation of Andorra.  
 Acknowledgments: Tom Dunfee, as a scholar, created an intellectual framework that accounts for multiple communities, in disciplines that often seem preoccupied with 
simpliﬁcation and universality. Tom Dunfee, as a colleague, person and friend, 
exempliﬁed community. He contributed to the growth of dozens of young scholars; he nurtured the creation and growth of academies of business law and of business ethics. His kind words and wry smile irresistibly invited friendship; in conversation he found that which was held in common; he shared what he loved and wanted to share in the joy of others. The impact that Tom Dunfee has had on the academy is self-evident. I would like to gratefully acknowledge the profound impact of Tom Dunfee in my own life and growth. Philip M. Nichols is an Associate Professor of Legal Studies and Business Ethics at The Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania. He has written numerous articles on issues concerning emerging economies, and particularly on the subject of corruption, and has held visiting faculty positions at universities in India, Mongolia, Singapore, and South Korea.    
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